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INTRODUCTION
Long-term care services and supports (LTSS) comprise a range of services for people with limited capacity for self-care due to physical or cognitive disability. 1 Expenditures for LTSS are not only a significant financial burden to families, but they also account for more than a third of Medicaid expenditures (Eiken et al. 2014) . There is growing concern that as the baby-boomers age, many of them will not have sufficient incomes to pay for LTSS and will become eligible for Medicaid if their need for LTSS becomes great enough that they require formal or paid LTSS. Barely 14 percent of Americans over the age of 50 purchase private insurance to protect against the costs of long-term care needs (Heath and Retirement Survey 2012) .
2 Limited private insurance coupled with (many people's) failure to save enough to self-insure long-term care costs puts pressure on Medicaid to finance LTSS when people have exhausted their savings.
Hence, it appears that there is some role for policy intervention.
Both the federal and state governments have developed strategies that attempt to shift long-term care costs away from Medicaid. These include incentives at the point of purchase by developing both state and federal tax deductions for purchasing long-term care insurance (LTCI). However, analyses of these strategies indicate limited returns of state tax deductions on the dollar (Goda 2011) ; the effect of the federal tax treatment of long-term care insurance premiums is not known. 3 An alternative strategy aimed at increasing long-term care insurance purchases was to introduce incentives at the point of use. In particular, one version of this strategy allows people to sequester a portion of their assets -equivalent to the value of a special long-term care insurance policy -from Medicaid requirements that they spend all of their assets (other than their house or car) 1 Most LTSS refers to personal assistance for activities of daily living (ADLs), and includes both medical and non-medical care (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2012). 2 The costs of LTSS can be catastrophic for the 5% incurring amounting to 260,000 US$. In 2011, the average annual cost for nursing home care was over $78,000, while assisted living communities cost an average of almost $42,000, 18,000-day care and 30,000 home help (O'Shaughnessy 2012) . 3 The federal tax treatment of long-term care insurance premiums is that they may be counted as deductible medical expenses but medical expenses may only be deducted if they exceed 10 percent of a person's income (for people under age 65; for those 65 years of age and older, the threshold for deducting medical expenses is 7.5 percent of income through 2016). The welfare gains from LTCP include the reduction in the financial risk exposure of needing LTSS, and greater control over at least the initial provision of LTSS. In addition, LTCP can be expected to provide an incentive for middle-income people to save more for possible expenses in their older years and to reduce use of "spend down" strategies to qualify for Medicaid coverage of LTSS. Hence, LTCP can be thought of as a strategy to promote private LTCI purchases and reduce Medicaid expenditures in the future. For this to occur, LTCP needs to alter historical trends in purchases of long-term care insurance and attract middle-class individuals who otherwise cannot afford LTCI.
However, LTCP programs were not designed to specifically target middle-class individuals, and hence their effect depends on changing the dynamics of the LTCI market.
The LTCP programs were initially developed in four states (California, Connecticut, Indiana, and New York) in the early 1990s, with grants from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF). Since 2005, 36 more states also have created LTCP programs. In addition to spreading the financial risk of LTSS needs, the LTCP programs seek to increase private LTCI coverage by linking the purchase of specific LTCI policies to special eligibility rules for accessing Medicaid benefits. 4 However, to date there have been limited evaluations of the LTC that draw upon econometric techniques. Liu and Prince (2013), using the Health and Retirement Survey, examines the effects of being a state that has adopted LTCP, and finds only modest effects on LTCI uptake. However, the study's empirical identification relies on the unlikely assumption that after a state made the LTCP available all subsequent LTCI purchases were comprised of partnership policies. 5 Further, Liu and Prince (2013) focuses primarily on the introduction of a new LTCP but does not distinguish between the two primary types of partnerships (explained more fully below). Importantly, one would expect differences between those states that adopted the program in the 1990's (RWJF states) and the states that did so since 2005.
In this paper, we draw upon the data from LTCP states, chaining both long and short-run trends of LTCI uptake, and Medicaid expenditures and claims. Given that the introduction of the LTCP occurred over a number of years and had some marketing shortcomings, we focus on an examination of differences in trends in the four original LTCP states ("RWJF states") compared to the rest of the United States (US) states.
Specifically, we analyze difference in trends of the LTCP program uptake, the overall uptake of private LTCI contracts, and Medicaid expenditure and claims in the four original LTCP states ("RWJF states") compared to the rest of the United States (US)
states. We adopt a flexible strategy so we can separate the pre-existing trends in the market for LTCI from the dynamic effects of the LTCP. In the next section, we provide background on the market for long-term care insurance and on the Partnership program.
In section three, we describe the data and our methods for analyzing the data. We report our results in section four, and conclude with a discussion of the results' policy implications in the final section.
BACKGROUND

The Market for Long-Term Care Insurance
The U.S. private market for long-term care insurance was established in the mid1980s, but demand has remained anemic since policies were first sold (Somers and Merrill 1991) . Given the small number of Americans over age 50 who hold policies, the LTCI market is only a fraction of its potential size (Stoltzfus and Feng 2011; AHIP 2012 
The Partnership for Long-Term Care
The Partnership program promotes the purchase of private long-term care insurance by offering policyholders' access to Medicaid under special eligibility rules regarding asset levels (Meiners et al. 2002) . Cost-effectiveness is a key rationale behind the Partnership program. Proponents of the program aim to reduce Medicaid spending in the future by creating an incentive for individuals to assume responsibility through LTCI for at least the initial phase of their need for LTSS (Rothstein 2007 (Alper 2006) . These state programs are referred to as the RWJF Partnership programs. Table A1 in the Appendix provides an overview of the different LTCP policy models that were developed in the RWJF programs and then evolved during their first dozen years of operation.
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New York initiated the "total asset protection" policy model in its LTCP, and Indiana added it as an option in 1998 (ILTCIP 2011). The New York policies are required to pay for three years of nursing home care or six years of home care, or some combination of the two. A policyholder who exhausts these benefits does not have to spend any remaining assets before being eligible for Medicaid to pay for LTSS; such assets are protected under the terms of the total asset protection model. Thus, it provides a strong incentive to purchase long-term care insurance. The program is targeted more to middle and upper-income people as an alternative to transferring assets to become Medicaid eligible (Meiners et al. 2002; Rothstein 2007) .
The "dollar-for-dollar" model originated in California, Connecticut, and Indiana, and was adopted by New York in 2006 (Meiners et al. 2002; NYSPLTC 2011 there is generally a lag between policy purchase and benefit payout. This is more important regarding the cost-effectiveness and Medicaid budgetary impact than it is for determining the programs' effects on LTCI market size (Meiners et al. 2002; Meiners 2009; Ahlstrom et al. 2004 ). Assessments of the Partnership Programs' budgetary impact 8 Indiana added a total asset protection option to the dollar-for-dollar model in 1998; it operates such that up to a threshold amount of coverage (the dollar equivalent of the cost of four years in an average Indiana nursing home), the policyholder is eligible for dollar-for-dollar asset protection when determining eligibility for Medicaid benefits. But a person also can purchase a partnership LTCI policy that provides protection for costs above the dollar-for-dollar threshold. Anyone who does that receives total asset protection along with Medicaid benefits when they exhaust their policy benefits (Meiners et al. 2002 Although it is common practice to equate demand and insurance uptake (e.g., Sloan and Norton (1997) ), the latter might not necessarily apply. 11 We are able to observe the number of policies purchased, the number of Partnership applications and the number of Partnership applications denied in each state. Our dataset includes a number of different controls. In particular, we consider the size of the market and how concentrated it is by including the total number of LTCI policies purchased, the number of companies earning premiums, the state income per capita, average LTCI premium (but we cannot distinguish the traditional and Partnership policy premiums), and total state population.
Empirical Strategy
Early studies of the LTCP programs focused primarily on their sales relative to potential buyers and the programs' budgetary impact on Medicaid (Meiners et al. 2002) . Only one study employs the HRS data and assumes ( Specifically, our empirical strategy uses a quasi-treatment effect approach where we define an intervention variable for the states that were able to implement a LTCP program -either binary or continuous when referring to market shares -and has a value of zero in non-Partnership states.
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The specification that we primarily specify is the following:
where (as in Table 2a reports the effect of a Partnership program on the number of LTCI policies purchased in a state; the estimated effect varies primarily by the empirical specification (in columns) followed and by the number of controls (in rows). Partnership status and time trend -controlling for per capita income, premiums, and number of insurers selling LTCI -have small but positive and significant effects on LTCI uptake. The results in Table 2a , with different specifications of the determinants of insurance contract uptake by state, suggest that there is a very modest but positive effect of Partnership programs on total LTCI uptake. One additional year of having a Partnership program increases the uptake of LTCI by 2% on the trend.
RESULTS
Effects on Total LTCI Uptake
However, when we run a subsample analysis of the periods before and after 2005 (see Table 2b ) in order to conduct robustness checks, we find a significant negative effect of Partnership programs on insurance uptake for the period 2005-2008 when only the RWJF states are included in the sample. This result appears to be due to New York, however;
when New York is excluded from the RWJF states, we find no effect of the original Partnership programs on LTCI uptake between 2000 and 2008. Table 2c shows parameter estimates using the same model for overall demand, using Partnership program applications as a proxy for overall demand. Again the results suggest a small effect of the Partnership programs on the overall trend in LTCI take-up. Moreover, the effect is tiny but negative when fixed effects are included.
14 [Insert Table 2a , Table 2b and Table 2c about here] [Insert Table 3 and Table 4 [Insert Table 3 around here]
Effects on Medicaid expenditure and claims
Effects on Medicaid Claims
We examine as a last feature the impact of Partnership programs on Medicaid claims for different subsamples of Partnership states displayed in Table 4 . The estimation strategy followed here relies on employing both the variable indicating the quasi-treatment effect strategy and a variable for the number of years of the Partnership insurance scheme.
Consistently, the results suggest a negligible effect of the Partnership programs and only negligible evidence of a reduction in Medicaid claims for non-RWJ states. However, these effects may be more related to between state variation -for example, states that were earlier adopters of their Partnership programs may be more innovative in general about ways to curb Medicaid cost growth.
[Insert Table 4 around here] [Insert Table 5 around here]
Price and Income Elasticity Estimates
Discussion
Drawing on a unique dataset from 1999-2008 that contains state-specific data on longterm care insurance contracts, Partnership LTCI contracts, and other state-specific information, we examined whether the presence of a Partnership program has expanded take-up of LTCI policies in a state's market for private long-term care insurance. Taking advantage of the fact that the introduction of Partnership programs was largely an exogenous event (given the moratorium in 1994) and a difference in trends empirical strategy, we analyzed the impact of Partnership contracts on LTCI uptake. We find the impact to be non-significant. We rely on a very rich dataset that contains information on partnership insurance contracts, Medicaid LTC expenditure and claims data to examine how sensitive each was to the introduction of the Partnership programs.
Our preferred estimates suggest no significant effects of the Partnership progams on
Medicaid expenditures and claims, and very small positive effects on total long-term care insurance uptake. Importantly, the results remain once we control for a long list of potential explanations including income, premium trends, demographics, and the competitive insurance environment at the state level. Several explanations for our results include poor targeting of the Partnership policies to middle-class individuals, along with poor informational and marketing campaigns about the programs (Alper 2006) . It could be also that insurance agents believed they would earn less selling Partnership policies compared to standard LTCI policies since a commission is a percentage of the premium, and premiums for Partnership policies are lower than standard LTCI.
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For all LTCI contracts, it could be that the Partnership programs' crowd-in effect is so great as to obscure the crowd-out effect documented by Sloan and Norton (1997) and Brown and Finkelstein (2004) ; this seems unlikely. It is also possible that welfare aversion stands out as an alternative factor, as the Partnership programs can be envisaged as reducing the stigma in having Medicaid pay for LTSS. Consumers that can afford LTCI policies could be averse to the Medicaid element in the Partnership plans, and instead choose traditional plans. This substitution could be part of why Partnership sales are not a higher percentage of overall LTCI sales, particularly in New York and California, which are less proactive about consumer education. Welfare stigma may also motivate middle-income individuals to forego purchasing a Partnership policy in favor of limited self-insurance or to gamble on not needing long-term care. This could help explain lack of growth in sales to middle-income consumers, although affordability is almost certainly the primary obstacle to market penetration. But given the basic difficultly and myopia surrounding long-term care planning, it is not surprising that some would be averse to the idea of planning on becoming a Medicaid participant. Further evidence of welfare aversion is limited, and Norton (1995) shows that welfare aversion may increase savings in some instances as elderly individuals receive asset transfers to avoid Medicaid eligibility.
In contrast, Partnership programs create a purchasing incentive by protecting assets up to the value of the insurance policy together with an insurance-created delay in Medicaid eligibility. The results of our analyses indicate that the incentive is modestly effective. Of course, the incentive depends on an absence of welfare stigma or on the utility from asset protection and Medicaid long-term care benefits outweighing the disutility generated from welfare participation (Moffitt 1983 ). However, Stuber and Kronebusch (2004) show that those who need Medicaid benefits are not necessarily more likely to overcome participation disutility; the ability to internalize welfare stigma is not systematically and inversely associated with individual-level needs.
The price inelastic demand for Partnership policies suggests that tax incentives or subsidies to reduce (net) premiums will not be effective in increasing LTCI coverage.
Extrapolations by Courtemanche and He (2009) , and TREND is a year trend term. Column (1) does not include any state level controls. Column (2) controls for logged GDP per capita. Column (3) adds a control for insurance market competition. (4) 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Notes: The dependent variable a continuous variable denoting the log number of insured lives per 10,000 people age 65 and older. The right-hand side variables LTCP and TREND are interacted; LTCP is a binary variable indicating status as a Partnership state (RWJ or Expansion), and TREND is a year trend term. For the basic OLS model, the right-hand side variables LTCP and NLTCI are interacted; NLTCI denoting the number of insured lives across all long-term care insurance policies. Panel A contains income and price elasticity using OLS estimate coefficients of logged state GPD per capita and logged average premiums. Panel B contains income and price elasticity estimates GLS random effects estimations of logged GDP per capita and logged average premiums. Panel C contains income and price elasticity using state fixed effects model estimation of logged GDP per capita and logged average premiums. The first column contains no additional right-hand side control variables. Column (2) controls for competition.
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APPENDICES:
APPENDIX A: 
C.2.3 Indiana
C.2.4 New York
Quarterly reports issued by the NYSPLTC provided the main source of data on the New We created .xls files with information from each of the states' reports, and then imported the spreadsheets into Stata 12.1. The four files were appended into a single Stata data file, which were merged into the P/PLTCI dataset.
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The The individual .xls files were downloaded from the Census Bureau and imported into Stata. After appending the state and US data files, all groups were removed except for total population (Total_Pop), 65 and older (_65_older), 85 and older (_85_older), total males (TotalMales), males 65 and older (Males65older), males 85 and older (Males85older), total females (TotalFemales), females 65 and older (Females65older), females 85 and older (Females85older), and under 18 (Under_18). These variables were merged with P/PLTCI dataset and used to create a number of variables weighted by population.
We calculated the percentage of people in each age group (total population, 65 and older, 85 and older) with private long-term care insurance, e.g. NIL_Total_Pop is the total number of policies purchased per 100 people. For the logarithmic specifications, the log of the various dependent variables is taken, e.g. logNinsu65 is the log of total policies purchased per 100 people age 65 or older: log(NIL_65_older +1).
C.4. Medicaid
Medicaid expenditure data comes from Centers reshaped the dataset to be in long format, and then merged the total expenditure variable (Medicaid_Exp) with P/PLTCI dataset. For the logarithmic model, we take the log of Medicaid expenditure per capita (lmedicaid).
C.5. GDP
Per capita real GDP by state (chained 2005 dollars) comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA 2012). We imported the .xls file into Stata, reshaped it long, dropped regional observations, and merged the state GDP per capita variable (GDP) into P/PLTCI dataset. For the logarithmic model, we take the log of GDP per capita (lgdp).
C.6. Expansion Partnership Programs
The 
